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1. Introduction and summary 
Our ongoing research in Hull is providing further evidence about the prolonged impact 
of the flood recovery process, and the severe distress and disruption to communities 
and individuals it entails. One core theme emerging in the results is the stress 
generated by the problems involved in repairing damaged properties. This submission is 
a response to Defra‟s consultation on the policy options for promoting property-level 
flood protection and resilience. By outlining some preliminary findings from our ongoing 
research in Hull, we comment on the themes and questions highlighted in the 
consultation and suggest some additional issues for consideration in the policy debate.   
 
By way of summary: 
 
 The trauma and distress experienced by residents during the flood recovery 
process, which disrupts the fundamental fabric of social life within the household and 
community, cannot be captured by cost-benefit analyses. Therefore, although we 
accept that financial analyses will have some part to play in determining where property-
level resistance and resilience measures are rolled-out, we argue that other, non-
economic factors should be taken into consideration when deciding which properties to 
target.  We would welcome further consultation on different approaches to targeting 
properties/groups. 
 Many of those taking part in our study have had their houses returned to their 
original condition. We are concerned that this represents a missed opportunity that has 
reproduced people‟s vulnerability to future flooding. Consequently, more must be done 
to encourage resilient repair following future flood events. We therefore support the 
consultation‟s statement about the importance of resilient repair (paragraph 1.12). We 
agree that property-level measures which may normally be considered uneconomical 
become much more worthwhile – and much less intrusive to family life – if carried out 
during the repairs process when there is already a high level of disruption in the 
household. 
 We support the consultation‟s statement that a lack of information on behalf of 
householders and tradesmen, coupled with an inability to cover the additional costs of 
resilient measures at a time when finances are already strained, can constitute 
significant barriers to implementation. However, our research indicates that the type of 
flooding experienced can also be problematic, with pluvial flooding being perceived by 
householders as particularly difficult to protect against, particularly when the water 
comes up from under the floor. By contrast, river or tidal flooding is often perceived as 
simpler to combat because the water is seen to have a single source. 
 Many households in Hull experienced „secondary flooding‟, where water entered 
beneath the property, soaking floorboards and joists, with the result that major repairs 
had to be carried out months later when the problem was finally identified. Given the 
magnitude of this problem in Hull, we suggest that it is particularly important to establish 
whether the kinds of resistance and resilience measures currently being proposed are 
capable of protecting households against this kind of „hidden‟ flood event.  
 Our research shows that debates about the causes of the flooding can constitute an 
additional barrier to the take-up of property-level measures. This is because such 
debates inevitably influence views about whether the flooding is likely to happen again 
in future.  
 Hull‟s example indicates that residents might be more willing to protect themselves if 
they feel that other organisations are also working to improve matters. Such „joint 
approaches‟ are considered by householders to be both fairer and more effective. This 
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does not mean that residents expect flood defences to be provided – clearly, such 
circumstances are not covered by this consultation. However, residents do expect local 
authorities, water companies and other agencies to fulfil their responsibilities (by making 
sure that the drainage system is properly maintained, for example). In short, 
householders do not think household-level measures should be viewed as a substitute 
for continued investment in – and maintenance of – an effective drainage system in 
urban areas. 
 We support the consultation‟s statement that more people would be likely to choose 
resistance and resilience measures if their actions were reflected in the terms of their 
insurance. Therefore, we recommend that, whichever policy option is chosen as a result 
of this consultation, the government and Environment Agency should work with the 
Association of British Insurers to ensure that more insurance companies provide 
financial incentives to encourage more householders to take up these measures. 
 Our research shows that tenants – as opposed to homeowners – are particularly 
vulnerable to the disruptions created by flooding. Those in the rental sector could 
therefore derive considerable benefit from the installation of property-level resistance 
and resilience measures. The government should consider how best to engage tenants 
and – crucially – landlords to ensure that the benefits of these measures can be 
extended to the rented sector. 
 We agree that the strength and nature of the barriers to implementation are such 
that market forces and individual choice are unlikely to result in more people taking up 
these measures. Government action is therefore needed to address these barriers by 
providing more information about such measures alongside funding to encourage their 
implementation.  
 We believe that option 2, where some form of subsidy is offered to residents in 
addition to a survey, would be a more effective means of encouraging take-up of 
property-level measures.  It would also offer a higher degree of flexibility at the local 
level which could be used to address concerns about fairness. For example, one 
approach might be to offer a partial level of subsidy to all households in the community 
but with the option of providing higher levels – or even a full subsidy – to more 
vulnerable groups. 
 If the objective of the scheme is to create „showcase‟ schemes with a view to 
encouraging implementation elsewhere, it is vital to choose the right communities to 
approach. We recommend choosing areas where there is already a high level of 
awareness, activism and community involvement around flood issues.  
 When consulting with communities, it is crucial to identify individuals from the local 
authority and Environment Agency with good people skills who can then approach local 
communities via trusted intermediaries. These individuals must be willing and able to 
listen to and work alongside local communities in order to help them take ownership of 
the scheme. 
 Much of the routine building work that is carried out after a flood is poor quality work 
that remains uninspected and unregulated. Therefore, if resistance and resilience 
measures are to be installed, either during the reinstatement work or at a later date, it is 
essential to ensure that this is done properly and then inspected – perhaps with a 
certificate given to the householder that could then be shown to the insurance company 
in order to qualify for a reduced premium, or to future buyers who might otherwise be 
anxious about buying the property. 
 We encourage the government to do everything it can to ensure that flooded homes 
are repaired in a resilient fashion. More research would be needed in order to establish 
the best way of doing this – for example, whether a voluntary code would be sufficient, 
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or whether some form of coercion via the Building Regulations would be necessary. 
However, crucial issues to address include the following: 
 Terms of insurance: Homeowners might be encouraged to introduce property-
level measures if this were reflected in reduced premiums.  
 Who pays for resilient repair? There is a lack of clarity and consistency in 
financing the repairs process.  Homeowners are also often under financial 
pressure during the recovery process. Therefore, if resilient repair is to 
become commonplace after flooding, options for funding, including 
government or self-funding, must be clear to all involved (householders, 
builders, insurance companies). 
 In addition to a general lack of information about what resistance and 
resilience measures are available, people who have just experienced flooding 
are often in a state of shock and they are therefore unlikely to spend any time 
researching and thinking about the options for resilient repair. Participants 
taking part in our study have said that they would like to have been given a 
guide which explains simply and clearly how to do all the things that you have 
to do after a flood. Information and guidance on resilient reinstatement should 
be included in this guide. Builders and surveyors should also be better 
informed about the options available, so that they can recommend suitable 
measures to householders.  
 Poor workmanship has been a major problem for flooded residents. Given 
that it is already difficult to source sufficient numbers of quality builders, 
tradesmen and materials during the recovery process, serious thought would 
be needed in order to ensure that resilient repairs are able to be completed 
swiftly and to a high standard. 
 
2. Background to our research 
The aim of our research, Flood, vulnerability and urban resilience: a real-time study of 
local recovery following the floods of June 2007 in Hull, is to undertake a real-time 
longitudinal study using an action research model to document and understand the 
everyday experiences of individuals following the floods of June 2007 in interaction with 
networks of other actors and organisations, strategies of institutional support and 
investment in the built environment and critical infrastructure. Focusing on Hull, the 
project design adopts a tried and tested action research methodology previously used to 
investigate recovery following the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease disaster (Bailey et al. 
2004, Convery et al. 2005, Mort et al. 2005, Convery et al. 2007).  The research 
therefore involves a longitudinal qualitative diary-based method developed to capture 
peoples‟ everyday experiences as they move through the drawn out process of 
recovery.  
 
A growing body of work has sought to better understand the social, economic and 
health impacts of flooding and the relationship between social and physical parameters 
of community resilience and preparedness (Twigger-Ross 2006, Thrush et al. 2005, 
Tapsell et al. 2005, Kirschenbaum 2002, Gordon 2004).  However, there is a dearth of 
empirically-based understanding about the processes people go through in recovering 
from flood disasters in the UK and the role of institutional support and investment in the 
built environment – including the potential contribution of property-level flood protection 
and resilience measures – within that.  
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Policy concerns for flood management have increasingly emphasised the need for 
development of both social and physical strategies in building resilience to live with 
flood (Defra 2005, Environment Agency 2005, National Audit Office 2001) but which 
strategies are the most appropriate and how these strategies should be balanced, 
resourced and implemented remains deeply problematic. In the context of the 2007 
floods we can examine two dimensions of resilience. First, the resilience that already 
exists to different degrees within processes of recovery that are currently operating – 
the task being to identify those aspects of the evolving everyday experience that 
demonstrate effective recovery and those which restrain, prolong or resist it.  
Understanding these dynamics of recovery requires a knowledge of the physical 
conditions of flood, the drainage infrastructure and the structural characteristics of 
properties in Hull, as well as an understanding of individual agency and the social 
structures (including socio-economic characteristics, community structures, institutional 
structures) through which such agency and, consequently, vulnerability and resilience, 
is produced (Pelling 2003, Perrow 1999, Rodriguez et al. 2006). 
 
Second, we can consider the resilience which can, in principle, be built during the 
process of recovery to better cope with and recover from future flood events.  The 
installation of property-level resistance and resilience measures is one example of this 
more future orientated notion of resilience-building, which is particularly important in the 
context of climate change (e.g. Berkes and Folke, 2003, Brooks 2003, Few et al. 2005, 
Yohe and Tolb 2002). It suggests that processes of adaptation are required rather than 
a return to the „original condition‟ – a goal which has itself been contentious, for 
example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans (Daniels et al. 2006; see 
also Tobin 1999). Whilst some argue that disasters provide moments of opportunity for 
learning and embedding of preparedness and future resilience (Mileti et al. 2004), there 
may be many reasons why this does not materialize (Harries 2008). Only by 
understanding in depth different experiences of, and perspectives on, the recovery 
process can we begin to identify where the opportunities and constraints for institutional 
and engineering responses may lie.   
 
The emphasis of this research is therefore on the “what, how and when” of people‟s 
everyday adaptation during the flood recovery process, captured over time. The project 
started in October 2007 and will continue until September 2009.   
 
2.1 Details of participants taking part in the study 
 
To date, we have completed 48 interviews, comprising 43 residents and 11 frontline 
workers1 (these figures add up to more than 48 because categories of frontline workers 
and residents were not mutually exclusive). 
 
Participants have been recruited from all areas of the city with a particular focus on 
West Hull, as this was the area most severely affected by the flooding. The following 
statistics provide a profile of our participants by age, tenure type and additional 
considerations. 
 
                                                 
1
 Defined as those who may not have been flooded themselves but who have been working with 
flood victims as part of their employment. The 11 frontline workers we have interviewed comprise 2 
teachers, 3 caretakers/community centre managers, 2 community wardens, 5 council/voluntary 
sector employees and 1 journalist. 
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Tenure  
Of the 43 residents interviewed: 31 owner occupiers, 7 council tenants, 2 private rented, 
3 housing association. 
 
Age  
Age profile of the 48 interviewees:  
 
20s 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s 




Number of interviewees with a disability in the family: 11 
 
Gender 
34 women, 14 men. 
 
Young families 
14 participants have children under 10. 
 
Insurance 
7 participants were uninsured. 
 
In addition to undertaking initial in-depth interviews, the participants have been recruited 
to keep diaries over a 12 to 18 month period.  The diaries are not structured, leaving it 
up to the diarist to decide what they feel is important to record.  Participants are also 
being brought together at quarterly intervals during the course of the project to discuss 
collectively issues affecting the recovery process as they emerge during the research 
project.  
 
3. Response to consultation 
This section is structured in response to the headings and questions outlined in the 
consultation document. The emphasis of our study is on understanding flood recovery 
from the perspective of those involved in the process.  We therefore use extracts from 
interviews, diaries and group discussions with householders involved in our study to 
illustrate the points made.  All names are pseudonyms to protect the anonymity of the 
participants. 
 
3.1 Consultation overview – introduction 
 
Q1 Do you think that the costs and benefits for the measures outlined here and in the 
Impact Assessment (Annex C) are reasonable estimates? Do you have further 
information to help refine the estimates? 
 
Householders‟ accounts of flood recovery in Hull support the consultation‟s assessment 
of the extreme distress and expense that flooding can cause. In particular, our research 
shows that much of this distress and expense results from having to deal, firstly, with 
the loss and of home and possessions and, secondly, with the lengthy process of repair 
that ensues as properties are refurbished.  
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“It has affected people… in a bad way.  I mean I was getting to the stage where 
I was in tears all the time because I didn‟t want to live like this.  I‟ve never lived 
in a house that‟s a mess and it was, it was just awful, it was just as if – the walls 
was disgusting and everything.  I mean it‟s took them – I mean some of mine 
down here – it‟s still a bit damp but it‟s took them a good six months to dry out.  
But there‟s no one there who will help you, you‟ll ring the Council and they will 
pass you from one person to the other, so you are not getting anything done.  
But it has, it‟s affected people and… it will affect people in different ways.” 
(Barbara, council tenant, interview) 
 
“It is now April and we have only finished the kitchen area.  We are so tired all 
the time, we argue every week, we never seem to have time for doing things for 
yourself, things we enjoy, no proper relax time.  And we‟ve also lost interest in 
everything.  I don‟t think we will stay together, I think this has just put a big 
wedge between us.  I think the only way forward is to sort house then sell it and 
try to start again, putting it behind us.  I know this is such a weak thing for us to 
do and we are both strong and love doing our house up. In the past every week 
we would be doing home improvements, but not like this, it‟s just too much. We 
said we wouldn‟t let the flood get the better of us but we have… The year of the 
flood we were getting married and my dad bought my wedding dress, which is 
still hanging at my parents… But I cannot see us getting married in the near 
future, as it seems too much stress to contend with.  And we have grown 
apart.” (Abby, homeowner, diary) 
 
In the case of Hull, we know that 1,476 people were still out of their homes one year 
after the flood, with 293 people still in caravans (Hull City Council, email communication, 
June 26, 2008). Of the 43 residents taking part in our study, one person is still out of his 
home, while another has only just returned – further proof that, for many of those 
affected, the floods are not a past event but, rather, a tragedy that is still occurring. 
 
Stress and anxiety can also continue to be experienced long after repairs have been 
completed and the person has returned to their home. Periods of bad weather, in 
particular, can be particularly stressful, as people fear a return of the flooding and are 
reminded of the emotions and hardships that they faced at the time: 
 
“When I go home, the first thing I do if it‟s been raining or is raining, is stop and 
check the level of the drain.  The last thing before I leave is check the level of 
the drain just to make sure that I‟m aware of its current state… There is a lot of 
anxiety if the weather is going to be bad.  As we move more into winter… the 
anxiety, I think, will rise and it‟s affecting people.  I think the main one is sleep 
patterns because a lot of us have said we are not sleeping through it and a lot 
of us are waking up and we‟ve dreamt it‟s been raining through the night 
because that‟s on our mind all the time.” (Amy, interview) 
 
Given the severity of these impacts and their continuation into the future, it is clear that 
steps must be taken to ensure that the hardships experienced by householders after 
flooding are minimised as much as possible. In our response to the Pitt Review, we 
argued that one way of doing this is to improve the help and support that is given to 
householders during the recovery process (Sims et al. 2008). However, as much of the 
distress is caused by the expensive and lengthy repairs process, reducing the level of 
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damage caused to homes and possessions by promoting the uptake of property-level 
flood protection and resilience measures would be another solution.  
 
In relation to Q1, while we recognise that cost-benefit analyses will inevitably be a factor 
in deciding how and when such property-level measures should be deployed, we would 
argue that such analyses should not be the only factor involved as they do not capture 
wider aspects of recovery, such as the emotional and psychological distress caused to 
householders. Resistance and resilience measures may therefore be beneficial to a 
wider range of households than those for whom such measures have been deemed 
„worthwhile‟ on the basis of cost-benefit analysis.  
 
This is particularly important when considering those who may be especially vulnerable 
to the impacts of flooding – for example, the elderly, the disabled or families with young 
children – all of whom find the current repair and recovery process particularly difficult. 
For example, Emma, a pensioner in her 70s, lived in her garage for six months over the 
winter with only temporary cooking facilities and no water supply because her husband, 
who suffered from a number of health complaints, refused to leave his home in case he 
was put into a hospital or nursing home and was not able to return: 
 
“They offered us accommodation in Scarborough but it was no good because 
he needs oxygen and everything.  It‟s just the psychological effect and the loss 
of everything what you‟ve worked for.  We‟d just finished at Easter, decorating 
and I thought at our age we‟d finished and now we are back at square one.  It‟s 
not a home anymore it‟s a house.” (Emma, homeowner, group discussion) 
 
Emma‟s acute vulnerability to the disruptions of flood recovery would not be apparent 
from a cost-benefit analysis. However, had her home been fitted with adequate 
resistance and resilience measures, she and her husband would have been back in 
their home much more quickly, thus avoiding much of the trauma that they experienced 
during their six months in the garage. 
 
We also support the consultation‟s statement about the importance of resilient repair 
(paragraph 1.12). We agree that property-level measures which may normally be 
considered uneconomical become much more worthwhile – and much less intrusive to 
family life – if carried out during the repairs process when there is already a high level of 
disruption in the household.  
 
Many people participating in our study have chosen to pay for minor alterations to their 
home during the repairs process – for example, renovating a bathroom, removing a 
dividing wall or getting new windows – because they wanted to make the most of the 
opportunity of having the builders in. However, few people took the decision to have 
flood resistance and resilience measures installed, for reasons which will be described 
in the next section.  
 
We are concerned that, in having their houses returned to their original condition, 
people‟s vulnerability to future flooding may have been reproduced. Consequently, more 




3.2 Barriers to take-up of property level flood protection and resilience and 
rationale for government action 
 
Q2 Do you think that the Government needs to give more information to high-risk and 
help them do more to protect themselves? Alternatively, do you think that the level of 
property-level flood protection and resilience should be left to market forces and 
individual choice? 
 
Our research in Hull is in broad agreement with the barriers identified in the consultation 
document and, as stated above, we agree that few of the houses affected in 2007 have 
been repaired in a flood-resilient fashion. However, some additional insights from Hull 
can extend and support the insights from previous research into these barriers.  
 
 
A) Type and nature of flooding 
Firstly, the type and nature of flooding experienced can have a role in affecting people‟s 
opinions on the efficacy of resilient repair. None of the participants taking part in our 
study had had any previous experience of flooding and they were therefore surprised 
and alarmed when they found water encroaching upon their properties. However, they 
were aware that Hull was vulnerable to river and tidal flooding and, as a result, they 
expected any floods to take the form of a slowly advancing body of water coming down 
the street. By contrast, in June 2007, Hull experienced a pluvial flood which resulted 
from the drains being overwhelmed (Coulthard et al. 2007a; 2007b). This flood 
manifested itself in strange and unexpected ways which were particularly frightening for 
householders. For example, many people found that water did not enter their homes via 
the door, as expected. Instead, it burst up through the floor, or came in through the 
walls.  
 
“I was just sat in the living room just having a cup of tea and then all of a 
sudden, believe it or not, it came in from the corner behind that chair. It must 
have come up from under. I went, “Here it comes”, and as quick as you went 
like that it was just up.” (Amanda, council tenant, interview) 
 
“I did have all the doors, all the back way, all the front way – I got all the quilts 
upstairs, all the pillars, padded everything, stuck plastic bags round, just 
anything that I thought would be OK and it didn‟t even come through the 
doors… I came walking through to the kitchen… like in the middle of the floor, 
like a big pool because I was looking out the window, where did that come 
from?  It had actually come through the bricks of the house before it actually 
came through.” (Abby, homeowner, interview) 
As shown in the examples above, the fact that the flood burst up through floors or came 
through walls resulted in householders feeling powerless to protect their possessions or 
prevent water entering their homes. Consequently, when asked if they had had any 
resistance or resilience measures installed during the repairs, many reported that there 
would have been no point as they felt that these installations would have had no effect 
upon keeping the water out. 
“We had concrete floors but it still came up through the concrete, so if I had put 
things on my doors, if I had raised my electric up, it wouldn‟t have done any 
good because it would have come up through the floors. For people with 
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wooden floors, unless you actually line underneath – which would cost money – 
and actually seal everything – it‟s still going to come up into the gap under your 
floor, which it will do because it‟s soil, so there‟s going to have to be some 
drastic work done to your house to get it so it works.” (Amy, householder, 
group discussion) 
There are several factors at work here. Firstly, our research supports the consultation‟s 
statement that the clear preference of householders is not for resistance or resilience 
measures, but for the water to be kept right away from their houses by flood defences or 
– in the case of Hull – better drainage management. However, if this first option is not 
possible then such property-level measures can have an important role to play as a 
„back-up plan‟. Understanding why these measures are not employed more frequently is 
therefore an important issue for investigation.  
The example given above shows that the nature of a pluvial flood, together with a lack 
of information about the capabilities of the various resistance and resilience measures 
available, can constitute a significant barrier to take-up. Most people were only aware of 
the possibility of sandbags, flood gates or concrete floors and, for the reasons described 
above, they felt that these measures would have been pointless when deployed against 
pluvial flooding whereby the water came up through the floors. Consequently, the kinds 
of changes people had made tended to be relatively minor in character – such as 
moving sockets and wiring higher up the walls, fitting higher skirting boards or raising 
the height of the doorstep.  
Tessa: We got this letter and it said „what have you done to make your house flood 
proof?‟ And, yeah, we raised the floor in the porch, haven‟t we, by six inches. But 
there was nothing else that we could do. 
Brian: I mean, they were suggesting things like covers for air bricks and things but, 
like that lady says, if your next door neighbour hasn‟t got it… 
Amy: It‟s still going to come in. Whether you raise the floor or what, it will 
eventually get through the soil. (group discussion) 
 
“All I‟ve had done really for resilient work is to have the height of the sockets 
increased and, as such, that‟s all. The kitchen‟s not removable, and that‟s a wood 
kitchen.” (Bruce, homeowner, group discussion) 
 
“Interesting article in the paper „Take steps to protect your homes from floods‟.  
From what I can fathom they are saying people wanted their homes put right and 
put back the way they were and that people have not took steps to protect their 
homes.  When our plasterer plastered the walls he used lime plaster and also 
coated the brickwork inside with a water repellent.  We had a good insurance 
company but at no time did they offer any advice about protecting our home.  But 
also in mind perhaps we should have thought about it, but you‟re that busy with 
everything I did not really think about it.  But I‟m going to look into a few things 
especially the airbricks, as that‟s where the water flowed in filling the underneath of 
the house and then rising up” (Tom, homeowner, diary) 
 
In some cases, it was builders, rather than residents, who appeared uninformed about 
what property-level measures were available. For example, Laura had had a series of 
problems with poor workmanship which resulted in her spending over a year out of her 
home. However, although her surveyor told her she could have the void beneath her 
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floors filled up, her builder refused to do this, and Laura did not feel that she was in a 
position to argue with him: 
Laura: They didn‟t even fill our recess up where the water actually sat. Because 
the chartered surveyor came round and the loss adjuster‟s trouble-shooter that 
they brought in at the end. And he said „oh, I think we could fill your void up with 
concrete‟. 
Bruce: Yes, lots of people have that. 
Laura: And then the builder came and said „no, we‟re not doing that, this was put 
there for a purpose‟. So I said „Oh. Right then. But the chartered surveyor 
mentioned it.‟ He said „Oh no, we‟re not‟, and it was never done. (group discussion) 
 
However, some participants had had more major changes instigated. Tim‟s professional 
experience as a structural engineer meant that he was able to make the decision to pay 
for some more radical measures during repairs to his home. In this case, his actions 
were prompted by a higher level of knowledge about what options were available, thus 
avoiding the feelings of helplessness experienced by those described above. He also 
had sufficient income to pay for these additional measures which were not covered by 
insurance. 
Tim: As regards the floors we are going to put them back in concrete rather 
than the timber floor again.  It will be a timber finish but it will be concrete up to 
sort of about that depth from the floor level.  The hall is an oak floor so we are 
having that put back in oak.   
Interviewer: With the concrete, is that because you know if something was to 
happen again it would be…? 
Tim: Yes that‟s right, the airbricks will be replaced with solid bricks so the water 
won‟t be able to get in.  The worst scenario would be that if it came up to the 
same level again it could still get to the wooden floor but that would be just 
floorboards and battens to be replaced, not right down to the bottom.  But let‟s 
hope it never happens again.  (Interview) 
 
We support the consultation‟s statement that a lack of information on behalf of 
householders and tradesmen, coupled with an inability to cover the additional costs of 
such measures at a time when finances are already strained can constitute significant 
barriers to implementation. However, our research indicates that the type of flooding 
experienced can also be problematic, with pluvial flooding – where the water comes up 
from under the floor – being perceived by householders as particularly difficult to protect 
against. By contrast, people seemed to regard river or tidal flooding as simpler to 
combat because the water is seen to have a single source and the flood comes from a 
particular direction. 
The type of flood event involved is also important in relation to Hull because of the 
major problem caused by „secondary flooding‟ in the city. The term „secondary flooding‟ 
refers to houses that were thought to have been unaffected because there was no 
visible evidence of flood water in the house. However, unbeknown to householders, 
water had entered into the void under the floor, soaking joists and floorboards, and its 
presence only became apparent some weeks or months later as problems such as 
warped floorboards, mouldy carpets and rising damp began to arise. We are told that 
instances of secondary flooding are still being discovered in Hull to this day, and this is 
extremely problematic, not only because those whose homes were affected in this way 
have to undergo the same devastating process of „stripping out‟, repair and 
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reinstatement as people who saw the water enter their property, but also because 
deadlines for claiming flood assistance imposed by insurance companies and the city 
council can make it very difficult for householders needing help this long after the initial 
flood event.  
Seven of those taking part in our research had experienced this kind of secondary 
flooding, including Rachel: 
“What happened – the downstairs toilet, the door started to stick and it never 
stuck before and I got my brother in law to come and he shaved a little bit off 
the bottom because we thought maybe it had just dropped.  But it did it again, it 
was sticking again and then my next-door neighbour‟s fireplace fell off the wall 
– the whole fireplace. …  I think in my mind I was saying „well I didn‟t get any 
water in so I must be fine, I must be absolutely fine, I didn‟t get any water in so 
everything must be OK‟.  But of course when they came and they tested the 
walls, the walls were damp.  It‟s amazing that, it‟s exactly the same amount of 
devastation, as we would have had if we had had a foot of water in the house” 
(Rachel, interview) 
 
Hull appears to have experienced this problem as a result of the type of water 
accumulation and the city‟s flat, low-lying topography. However, the scale of the 
problem and the difficulty that secondary flooding has caused householders, insurance 
companies and the council shows that this is something that the government and key 
agencies must be aware of for the future.  
 
In relation to this consultation, we suggest that it is particularly important to establish 
whether the kinds of resistance and resilience measures currently being proposed are 
capable of protecting households against this kind of „hidden‟ flood event.  
 
B) Dispute over the causes of flooding 
While we agree that there is an element of „moral hazard‟ in people‟s unwillingness to 
install property-level resistance and resilience measures, Hull‟s example shows that 
such feelings are exacerbated by uncertainty and dispute over the causes of the 
flooding. In the aftermath of the floods, reports produced by an Independent Review 
Body concluded that the floods resulted from the capacity of the drains being 
overwhelmed by a storm that was of a magnitude so severe that it would normally only 
be expected once in every 150 years (Coulthard et al. 2007a; 2007b). However, the 
report also criticised Yorkshire Water for the poor maintenance of its pumping systems 
and suggested that modernisation works carried out by the company had reduced the 
system‟s capacity to deal with extreme rainfall events. Locally, some residents also 
blamed the council for not cleaning the city‟s roadside gullies, while others suggested 
that climate change was to blame. 
 
Our research shows that such debates about the causes of the flooding are likely to 
have an impact upon people‟s decision whether or not to install property-level 
resistance and resilience measures in their homes because they inevitably influence 
views about whether the flooding is likely to happen again in future.  
 
For example, those who felt that the flooding was a freak natural incident saw no reason 
to make changes to their home as they believed that such an event would not happen 
again in their lifetimes. Equally, many of those who felt that Yorkshire Water or the 
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council were responsible were also deterred from making changes, not just because 
they felt it was unfair that they should bear the burden of protecting themselves (the 
„moral hazard‟ argument) but, more fundamentally, because they felt that individual 
actions at the household scale would be ineffective unless these bigger agencies also 
took action. Indeed, responses by several participants suggest that they might be more 
willing to take action themselves if they were reassured that these agencies were also 
„doing their bit‟ by cleaning drains, providing suitable flood warnings and continuing to 
invest in the larger drainage infrastructure.  
 
Elizabeth: The thing is, how do you protect your property from floodwater? I 
just do not see – they say, “How are you going to protect it?” Well how can 
you? 
Anna: Apart from having a moat round it! 
Brian: We have a dog and I take him out for a walk three or four times a day 
and… all the man-hole covers… have grass growing out them.  So if there‟s 
any heavy rain it‟s not going to go away, there‟s no way it can. This isn‟t only 
one, it‟s every one. 
Tessa: We have actually noticed this last week – 
Brian: Yes, the Council seems to have hired a couple of lorries, they are 
private lorries but they‟ve got badges on that says, „Hired to Hull City Council.‟  
And they‟ve got these vacuum cleaner things… gully cleaners.  And I‟ve seen 
two of these; they‟ve been down near us twice… 
Elizabeth: My son lives on [street name], which is straight onto the big drain 
that goes all the way along, it‟s tidal.  And because you could see the water 
before but it‟s all been tidied and there‟s things like that do give you a bit of 
hope.  Cleaning the bank sides.  And when I went to my son‟s in Barnsley on 
the train, you know, lots of the riverbanks had seemed to have been done.  
So I think people are taking some notice of us but it‟s if they keep it up 
because they stop, don‟t they? And then they don‟t do it. 
Elisa: And I think they should give you information and let you know that 
they‟ve done this area so that people are aware of it, you know, that they‟ve 
been round and cleaned the drains at such and such an area because people 
do worry don‟t they? (group discussion) 
 
It could therefore be argued that investment in flood protection should not be seen 
as an either/or choice between individual householder action and larger-scale multi-
agency action. Clearly, both approaches have a role to play and Hull‟s example 
indicates that residents might be more willing to protect themselves if they feel that 
other organisations are also working to improve matters. Such „joint approaches‟ are 
considered by householders to be both fairer and more effective. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this consultation it is important to recognise that, although appropriate 
household level action by individuals could have an important role to play in reducing 
the damage caused by flooding, such measures should be undertaken alongside 
those carried out by larger agencies, and under no circumstances should household 
measures be viewed as a substitute for continuing investment in – and maintenance 






C) Insurance terms 
As noted in paragraph 1.17 of the consultation document, many people‟s insurance 
terms do not reflect the risk exposure of individual properties. Our research supports the 
consultation‟s view that this remains a major barrier to the take-up of property-level 
resistance and resilience measures. When asked if they would consider implementing 
such measures in their own homes, many participants said that they would do so if their 
premiums were to be reduced, while others stated that, although they wanted this done 
during the repairs to their properties, they had not taken this opportunity because 
insurance companied classed such measures as “improvements” and refused to pay for 
them. 
 
Marie: If it [property resistance and resilience measures] made a difference to your 
insurance, I think you‟d be more keen – if it was taken into account. 
Bruce: Well that‟s the other point. And I did say to the chap from the Association of 
British Insurers… „If people signed up to the Floodline number, could that give 
them a discount from the insurance companies?‟ Because if you get a phone call 
saying that there‟s a potential flood, you‟d hike everything upstairs. You‟d limit the 
number of valuables below. Where‟s the incentive to join the Floodline? You know, 
it‟s benefitting insurance companies because, if it did happen again, a lot of stuff 
would be upstairs… But the response from him, I think, was something to do with 
data protection and stuff of that nature. And it negates the object of trying to 
formulate some linkage between everybody involved, which is kind of the crux of 
the problem, isn‟t it? (group discussion) 
 
“Some people round here have had solid concrete floors put in so it can‟t come up 
through the floor again.  But… it‟s an extra cost, which some loss adjusters 
wouldn‟t sanction and others it‟s impractical because of where the house is and the 
level of the house and, in other places, it takes so long to dry that it puts you so far 
back that people have said, „oh I can‟t wait that long, I just can‟t go with that‟.  So 
most of us haven‟t had it done, I think two people have had it done in this area.” 
(Leanne, homeowner, interview) 
 
Therefore, we recommend that, whichever policy option is chosen as a result of this 
consultation, the government and Environment Agency should work with the 
Association of British Insurers to ensure that more insurance companies provide 
financial incentives to encourage more householders to take up these measures.  
 
D) Tenure type and the problems of the rental sector 
We are concerned that much of this consultation and its associated research is based 
around work with homeowners, as opposed to private renters or those who rent from a 
council or housing association. Our research in Hull suggests that private renters may 
be particularly disadvantaged during the flood recovery process because they have little 
protection or control around what happens to their home. For example, Holly and her 
husband were private renters with two young children. Their home was rendered 
uninhabitable by the floods and they immediately set about trying to find somewhere 
else to rent. However, this task was made virtually impossible by two factors. Firstly, the 
number of rented properties in Hull were in very short supply because of the number of 
people who had had to move out. Secondly, because homeowners moving into 
temporary accommodation were having their rents paid by insurance companies, rental 
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prices across Hull increased massively, creating problems for genuine renters like Holly 
who had to meet these inflated costs out of their own pocket. 
 
Tom: We went and saw about five or six houses but none of them were…. 
Holly: The thing is all the prices seemed to like shoot up as soon as the floods 
happened and the things that we could afford were just ridiculous.  Some of 
them had holes in the walls; there was dampness all around. 
Tom: We went to see a foreman down [x] Road that, was it £90 a week? 
Holly: Yes, it just seemed too good to be true, but it was. 
Tom: We went to see it, it had obviously been like student accommodation 
before because all the doors were kicked in, there was big holes in the walls, 
banisters were falling away from the walls, there was mouse droppings in the 
cupboards. 
Holly: I think if your brother didn‟t know the landlord here we‟d have probably 
still been at our parent‟s house. (Holly and Tom, private renters, interview) 
 
When they first joined the study, Holly and Tom were not even sure if they would be 
allowed back into their rented home once it was repaired, so they were under pressure 
to find somewhere permanent to live at a time when they had lost everything (they had 
no insurance) and were very strained financially. Equally, Erica was a full-time carer for 
her grand-daughter who was dependent on income support. Her rented house was 
badly damaged in the flood but, because she had such difficulty finding somewhere else 
to move to, she was left living in the house (which, by this time, had mould and fungus 
growing up the walls) for six months after the floods, during which time her grand-
daughter suffered constant illnesses as a result of her living conditions.  
 
Erica: You had to find your own accommodation.  That‟s what made it hard 
because the Corporation never had no houses empty. 
Interviewer: Because of everyone else moving out? 
Erica: Yes. I had her at the doctors about four times on antibiotics, because 
the smell was just in the house all the time and all the walls were going black. 
Interviewer: And you had to live there like that because you couldn‟t find 
anywhere else? 
Erica: Yes. (Erica, private renter, interview) 
 
Similar arguments can be made for those who rent from councils or housing 
associations and who are often left very dependent on their landlords during the repairs. 
Helen, a council tenant, described the kinds of problems that arose as she was left 
waiting for action to be taken about her property. 
 
Helen: For about a fortnight I couldn‟t come downstairs at all because the 
house had to dry out down here.  I was waiting for Council to bring me driers, 
which they never did, they never brought me any driers.  So to dry my house 
out downstairs I was leaving my central heating on all day and all night 
downstairs to dry my house out, which I managed to do. 
Interviewer: So did someone help you clear anything? 
Helen: No, nobody came in to clear anything, it was me.  My brother in law 
and my sons came down, they took all my flooring up and then my daughter 
in law, myself and my brother in law, we had to clean everything with 
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disinfectant and mops, buckets and we had to keep going over and over and 
over it.   
Interviewer: So nobody came from the Council came to ask what had 
happened, if you needed any help? 
Helen: No nothing.  All they came to do was to remove furniture and that out of 
people‟s gardens. But they never came to clean you house, nothing. (Helen, 
interview) 
 
These examples illustrate two issues of key importance to this consultation. Firstly, it 
shows that those in the rented sector can be particularly vulnerable to the impacts of 
flooding as they often have limited financial resources and little in the way of insurance. 
For those in the private sector, the rapid rise in demand for rental properties after the 
flood, and the inflated prices charged for them can make it very hard for them to source 
alternative accommodation, while those renting from the council or housing associations 
are very dependent on their landlords in terms of what repairs are done and when. It 
could therefore be argued that resistance and resilience measures would be especially 
valuable to tenants because their particular circumstances make them very vulnerable 
to the loss of home and possessions that often accompanies flooding. Secondly, as 
highlighted previously, tenants often have little or no control over what physical changes 
are made to their properties. The decision about whether to install flood resistance and 
resilience measures is therefore entirely in the hands of the landlord, which is potentially 
very problematic. 
 
For the purposes of this consultation, therefore, we would urge the government to 
recognise tenants as a vulnerable group that could benefit from the installation of 
property-level resistance and resilience measures. The government should consider 
how best to engage tenants and – crucially – landlords to ensure that the benefits of 
these measures can be extended to the rented sector. 
 
 
In answer to Q2, the strength and nature of the barriers outlined above, together with 
those described in the consultation document, are such that market forces and 
individual choice are unlikely to result in more people taking up property-level flood 
resistance and resilience measures. Government action is therefore needed to address 
these barriers – preferably by providing more information about such measures 
alongside funding to encourage their implementation (see below). However, our 
research shows that care must be taken to ensure that the kinds of property-level 
protection measures proposed are capable of dealing with the particular challenges of 
pluvial and secondary flooding. The government must also work with insurance 
companies to ensure that householders implementing such measures are rewarded 
with a reduction in premiums while also ensuring that the responsibility for tackling 
flooding does not just lie with the individual homeowner. While we accept that these 
measures are designed to help householders in areas where large-scale flood defences 
are not economically viable, it is important to note that property-level resistance and 
resilience measures must be undertaken alongside continued investment in, and 
maintenance of, the drainage infrastructure. In short, there is a clear difference between 
saying „we would like you to take action to protect your own property because investing 
in large-scale flood defences is not economically viable in your area‟ – which seems a 
reasonable request – and „we would like you to protect yourself because we are not 
maintaining the drainage system properly‟ – which is unacceptable because it is an 
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abdication of responsibility to the public. Finally, the vulnerability of those in the rented 
sector must be recognised and efforts made to ensure that the benefits of property-level 
measures can be extended to those in this group. 
 
3.3 Part 2 – Increasing take-up of property-level flood protection and resilience 
 
Q3 If a government grant scheme were to be introduced, do you agree that it should 
initially focus on households rather than businesses? 
 
Q4 Do you think that a free home survey scheme to households in high-risk 
communities would be an effective way to drive increased take-up of property-level 
flood protection and resilience? What else could be done to encourage greater 
voluntary take-up of measures? 
 
Q5 Is it reasonable to expect people living in high-risk areas to pay much or all of the 
cost of protecting their homes from flood damage? What viable options exist for 
supporting lower-income households? 
 
Q6 Is it appropriate to use public funds to subsidise the costs of flood protection or 
resilience for individual properties, rather than just paying for a free home survey? 
 
Q7 Do you have suggestions on how we could ensure that any future grant scheme is 
simple to administer but also fair? Do you think that it would be a good idea to deliver 
the free surveys or the subsidies via teams who already deliver similar schemes, such 
as those responsible for private sector housing renewal? 
 
Q8 Should any subsidy scheme offer full subsidies for a small number of high risk 
properties or partial subsidies for a larger number of properties? Is a £4,500 cap for the 
measures themselves (excluding survey) an appropriate level for the subsidy? 
 
Q9 Should the subsidy be offered to all appropriate at-risk properties or only low-income 
households or communities? Should the subsidy be available to all those on qualifying 
benefits or based on full means testing? 
 
Q10 Do you think that the costs and benefits for the government schemes outlined in 
the Impact Assessment (Annex B) are reasonable estimates? Do you have further 
information to help refine the estimates? 
 
Q11 Which approach do you think will be most effective at increasing take-up – offering 
free home surveys to households in a large number of high risk communities, or offering 
to subsidise property-level measures for households in a smaller number of 
communities? 
 
Work with research participants in Hull suggests that the first option of a free survey 
may be enough to prompt more affluent residents with a high level of risk awareness 
and motivation to take action. Offering people such a survey would be particularly 
helpful to those who are considering taking action but are unsure of what measures 
would be most effective. 
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However, free surveys would not help those who could not afford to pay for the 
measures or those who believe that individual action would be ineffective or unfair if 
carried out without wider commitment on behalf of central and local government and 
other agencies such as Yorkshire Water. Indeed, some participants were concerned 
that being offered such a survey without any subsequent help towards the costs of 
installation would stigmatise their households as being high risk properties, with the 
result that no one would want to buy them in future 
 
“So you have a survey – absolutely fantastic – but all those people who have 
actually had a survey, when they try and sell their house or they try and move 
on, they‟re not going to be able to afford what is suggested in the survey for 
flood measures. So therefore you‟ve instantly put them at a bad point 
because you‟re telling them that this house needs all this done to it to make it 
safe for flooding in a flood risk area. There‟s no way you‟re going to pay for it, 
so you‟ve devalued the property instantly.” (Amy, group discussion) 
 
Furthermore, if the objective of government intervention is to create „showcase‟ areas of 
property-level resistance and resilience in order to stimulate market growth, raise 
awareness of what measures are available and provide encouragement to 
householders in other areas, then uptake of such measures must be as high as possible 
in the scheme‟s chosen areas. However, free surveys alone are unlikely to result in high 
levels of uptake in communities where there are large numbers of low income families, 
rented or council properties or other vulnerable groups, such as elderly or disabled 
residents. In such cases, residents would be unable to afford the cost of installing the 
measures or unwilling to put up with the disruption involved in their installation. Such a 
strategy would run the risk of creating divisions within communities and resentment 
towards the government, who might be seen to be favouring wealthier residents at the 
expense of more vulnerable people. Care should be taken to avoid creating such 
divisions as our research in Hull shows that, while communities can be brought together 
in the immediate aftermath of the floods, perceptions of uneven treatment emerging 
during the longer-term recovery process can lead to resentments arising between 
particular groups such as the insured and the uninsured, and between council tenants 
and home owners.  
 
Option 2, where some form of subsidy is offered to residents in addition to a survey, 
would bring the measures within reach of lower income households and show a greater 
political willingness to support households in making the transition to property-level 
measures. Such an approach would encourage higher take-up rates and would ensure 
that measures are deployed more evenly across communities. It would also offer a 
higher degree of flexibility at the local level which could be used to address concerns 
about fairness. For example, one approach might be to offer a partial level of subsidy to 
all households in the community but with the option of providing higher levels – or even 









3.4 Delivery mechanisms 
Q12 How could local authorities, the Environment Agency and communities best work 
together to deliver property-level schemes? What should their respective roles be? 
 
Q13 What would be the most effective ways of consulting with members of the selected 
communities in order to communicate risk information, help them understand flood 
protection and resilience, and engage them fully in the schemes? 
 
Q14 Do you support an approach that promotes local flexibility of spend or do you 
prefer a more nationally consistent approach? 
 
Our research in Hull shows that a strong level of community engagement is crucial 
when trying to prompt debate and action around flooding issues. The Independent 
Review Body‟s report into the city‟s emergency response to the flooding noted that Hull 
was helped by high levels of social capital and a strong community ethos in the affected 
areas. In particular, the voluntary sector‟s role in the recovery was praised as pre-
existing community groups went into immediate action to help local people (Coulthard et 
al. 2007a; 2007b). One example of this process at work was the role of Hull‟s 
community wardens (Hull Community Warden Service 2008) who, although not 
specifically trained in flooding issues, were used to working with local communities and 
thus were able to mobilise quickly to help those most in need. As a result of regular 
contact with local people, the wardens knew who were the most vulnerable residents 
and were able to target their recovery efforts accordingly.  
 
The Independent Review Body concluded that future efforts to improve emergency 
response procedures in the city should work with this existing community structure, 
rather than against it (Coulthard et al. 2007a; 2007b), and our research into flood 
recovery in the city accords with this finding. For example since the floods, several of 
our diarists have become active members of community flood groups or other residents‟ 
associations and, during group discussions, participants have expressed a willingness 
to be involved in decisions regarding drainage and infrastructure management in the 
city: 
 
“We‟ve actually started a Residents Association from the flooding, we‟ve got 
quite a few strong members and we are working towards stopping it...  But the 
support again that everyone has mentioned, it‟s come from the community.  
We know all our neighbours, we stop and talk and waving.  The strangest 
thing I found was you are inviting people into your houses and they are 
inviting you into theirs, which normally doesn‟t happen with just sort of 
neighbours that pass in the street.  But every one is very open and we are 
going through the same thing.” (Amy, homeowner, group discussion) 
 
Nigel: They [the council, Yorkshire Water and Environment Agency] could do 
to have some of us on a panel or something really and actually start doing 
these things… 
Susan: But a good idea would be if this committee ever came to be, that 
someone came to a meeting like we are having today, you know? As 
opposed to somebody else going out there, bringing somebody into us in the 
area, where it‟s been flooded, so that people feel at home if you like.  You 
know, rather than going shooting off somewhere totally strange because 
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people that go anywhere like that tend to sit with their mouths tightly shut – 
they don‟t want to speak. (group discussion) 
 
As stated previously, if the aim of this consultation is to promote showcase schemes of 
property-level resistance and resilience measures, then it is clear that high levels of 
community support, ownership and engagement will be crucial in ensuring their 
success. A sensible approach might therefore be to start with communities where there 
is already a high level of community involvement, awareness and activism around 
flooding on the grounds that these communities might be receptive to – and supportive 
of – property-level schemes.  
 
Identifying such communities could be done with the advice of local authorities and the 
Environment Agency. For example, Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council has been 
working with communities in areas worst affected by flooding by establishing local 
residents' flood groups and engaging communities in identifying pinch points and 
problem areas.  The council then acts as an intermediary to approach the relevant 
agencies and deal with the issues involved.  It has also established a strategic, multi-
agency forum to deal with flooding in the borough, which brings together local residents 
with a range of stakeholders involved in flooding and drainage issues, from the 
Environment Agency, Yorkshire Water, Internal Drainage Board, the emergency service 
 and the voluntary sector through to the relevant departments of the local authority. The 
forum's purpose is to identify, discuss and take action around flood-related issues that 
need to be dealt with in the Barnsley area2. 
 
Having identified which communities to target, finding the right way to approach 
householders will be crucial in determining the success of the scheme. One suggestion 
might be for a representative from the Environment Agency (EA) or local authority (LA) 
to make contact with the organiser of the local flood or community group to explain the 
scheme. The first step here could be a small meeting just involving these 
representatives and a few key members from the flood or community group. At this 
meeting, the EA/LA representative(s) could take along some leaflets, explain the 
scheme to the community group representatives and ask for their support in getting 
local householders involved. The community group representative(s) could then go back 
and explain the scheme to local householders via a residents‟ meeting or other 
appropriate avenues with the aim of getting residents along to a public meeting where 
they could meet the EA/LA representative(s) themselves and ask questions about the 
scheme. It might also be helpful at this point to give residents some input into the design 
or implementation of the scheme to help them feel involved in the project – for example, 
what style of flood gates would they prefer? What sort of options for installation?  
 
Such measures could also be supplemented by making information available via articles 
in the local newspaper, on the local radio station and on dedicated websites. 
 
Obviously some degree of local flexibility would be important here but our research 
indicates that there are two factors that will be crucial in ensuring the success of this 
contact process. Firstly, it is essential that the EA/LA representative(s) chosen to meet 
residents and explain the scheme are approachable, good communicators who are 
                                                 
2
 For more information, contact Derek Bell, Principle Flood Resilience Manager for Barnsley 
Metropolitan Borough Council on 01226 787654, DerekBell@barnsley.gov.uk. 
 22 
used to working with the public. Secondly, the role of the community representative is 
essential because of the need to find some form of trusted intermediary between the 
EA/LA and local residents. This person would not necessarily have to be the leader of a 
flood group – for example, they could be a community warden or member of a residents‟ 
association. However, they would need to be someone who is well liked and trusted 
locally and who has good links to the community. Both these factors are vital because it 
can sometimes be difficult to establish trust and understanding in communities that have 
experienced flooding. This is because, having gone through a traumatic recovery 
process where it can sometimes feel as if all the various agencies involved (builders, 
council, insurance, utilities companies, etc.) are against you, people often feel very 
angry and mistrustful of the many „experts‟ that they feel have let them down and, 
consequently, they are likely to be very hostile to yet another „outsider‟ coming in and 
telling them what they should be doing.  
 
“In my lowest moments when logic flies out of the window, I feel very angry at 
all the agencies who failed in their responsibilities when the floods happened – 
local council, Environment Agency, Yorkshire Water etc. not only for the trauma 
people have suffered re. damaged homes + property, but the side effects – far 
reaching and unique to each family.” (Caroline, homeowner, diary) 
 
“Five years ago the Council decided they would cut costs by reducing the 
amount of drain cleaning and they reduced it to one and they‟ve saved 
£120,000 a year.  Now the Council will only admit that… They‟ve really let the 
residents down and if they‟d been in business they‟d have votes of no 
confidence and they would have been kicked out.  I don‟t hold some of the 
individual councillors responsible but Cabinet has made these decisions and 
passed them and must have been aware of what the ramifications might have 
been.  So there‟s a lot of bitterness.” (James, homeowner, interview) 
 
Thus what is needed is an ability to identify individuals from the local authority and 
Environment Agency with good people skills who can then approach local communities 
via trusted intermediaries. These individuals must be willing and able to listen to and 
work alongside local communities in order to help them take ownership of the scheme. 
  
3.5 Part 3: Further issues including encouraging resilient repair and 
refurbishment 
 
Q15 Which professional groups are appropriate for the role of conducting household 
flood risk surveys? What more needs to be done to increase capacity and expertise on 
flood risk issues amongst these professional groups? 
 
Q16 How can we encourage new innovative flood protection products, while ensuring a 
robust system for testing new products? What is needed to provide assurance that 
products are suitable for their intended use, such as the reinstated BSI Kitemark or an 
alternative quality assurance mark? 
 
We agree that it is essential to find some way of ensuring that the products offered to 
householders are fit for purpose and – crucially – correctly installed. As indicated in the 
preceding section, those who have been flooded previously are often very mistrustful of 
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builders or surveyors as a result of bad experiences with „professionals‟ whose poor 
judgement or workmanship has created havoc in their home.  
 
Particular anxiety and resentment centres around the fact that many homeowners have 
never had an inspector around to check the finished work or been told how much their 
claim was for. They are concerned that builders may have claimed large sums of money 
from the insurance company for the work and then done the repairs „on the cheap‟, thus 
keeping much of the money for themselves. They are also concerned that, as 
homeowners, they do not have the experience to recognise shoddy or dangerous work 
and that the consequences of this may only be apparent years later when they come to 
sell their homes or when major structural problems occur. However, for one of our 
diarists, the problems of poor workmanship have been so acute that she and her 
husband are now having to move out of their home for a second time so that the house 
can be „ripped out‟ and refurbished again from scratch. 
 
“You get to the stage where you haven‟t got the energy, you settle.  You want 
everybody out of your house.  We actually said to our workmen, because our 
back door, when we looked at the top of the back door, the left hand side was 
three inches lower than the right hand side.  We said to the plasterer, „Would 
you accept that in your house?‟  He said, „Not if I was paying for it, no‟. A lot 
of workmen thought that because it was coming through the insurance, we 
weren‟t paying for it so it didn‟t matter.” (Amy, homeowner, group discussion) 
 
“Clear my emails and also send our loss adjuster… a lengthy email and 
photos of our shell of a house.  Show photos to colleague – they are very 
shocked at the state of my house.  One of my colleagues even asks for some 
copies of photo to forward onto her husband, as his mother‟s also a flood 
victim and she even says his mum‟s house isn‟t as bad as ours! [Loss 
adjuster] replies to email, he says he will get onto [company name] who is 
supposed to be managing builders [company name].  He appears to be 
quibbling over some of the damage, which the builders did!  Not our fault they 
broke burglar alarm, my toilet and damaged my bathroom floor!  Also the 
fireplaces!... He has seemed to now realise the builders have been telling fibs 
AGAIN!  He is saying he may try to change builders AGAIN!” (Laura, 
homeowner, diary) 
 
Marie: That‟s my worry is what you are saying – we don‟t know, we are not 
tradesmen – we don‟t know if that‟s been fitted or whether corners have been 
cut on materials. 
Olivia: I mean there were things on there [the reinstatement schedule] that we 
looked at and we thought, „you are actually kidding me – that does not need 
doing‟, and then there were things on there that we knew needed doing but 
they didn‟t do.  Every tradesman and every sort of loss adjuster company 
seems to be giving a different – there‟s no sort of… standardisation of „you 
need this, this, this and this‟… We‟d really like somebody independent to check 
the work because we don‟t know what we should have to put up with. (group 




Such examples show that much of the routine building work that is carried out after a 
flood is poor quality work that remains uninspected and unregulated. Therefore, if 
resistance and resilience measures are to be installed, either during the reinstatement 
work or at a later date, it is crucial to ensure that this is done properly and then 
inspected – perhaps with a certificate given to the householder that could then be 
shown to the insurance company in order to qualify for a reduced premium, or to future 
buyers who might otherwise be nervous about buying the property.  
 
There are several reasons for this: firstly, given that householders may have had bad 
experiences with builders in the past, it is vital that they are able to feel safe in their 
homes and regain some trust in the work that has been carried out. Secondly, if the aim 
of the scheme is to create showcase examples that will encourage other people to take-
up property-level measures, it is clear that such measures must be shown to work 
effectively. Poor quality or badly installed products that are found wanting in the event of 
a flood would be a disaster for public confidence in property-level measures. Thirdly, 
and finally, some people have reported companies trying to „take advantage‟ of them by 
trying to sell them products such as flood gates which they suspect may be unsuitable 
for their situation. Better information, quality assurance and product testing would 
ensure that residents are able to choose the most suitable options for their homes. 
 
3.6 Resilient repair and refurbishment 
Q17 Do you think we have identified the correct costings and the range of costs are 
right? Do you agree with our analysis of the costs and benefits of flood resilience 
(Annex C)? 
Q18 In the event of a major flood, would the supply of skills and materials be sufficient 
to enable the resilient repair of all affected homes? Would bottlenecks in the supply 
system cause delays in restoration? 
Q19 Do you think that an independent quality-assurance standard would help to 
encourage resilient repair? Are there any other viable voluntary approaches? 
Q20 Is compulsion an appropriate way to increase the use of resilient repair in high-risk 
areas or do you think individual consumer choice is the right route? Would you support 
a compulsory requirement for resilient repairs if an economic case could be made for 
such a requirement? 
 
As discussed previously, evidence from our research suggests that few properties in 
Hull have been repaired in a flood resilient fashion. We are concerned that this 
constitutes a significant missed opportunity that could reproduce people‟s vulnerability 
to future flooding events. From a purely economic perspective, the fact that installing 
flood resilience measures during reinstatement only costs an extra £5,000-£10,000 (as 
opposed to £10,000-£15,000 at other times) shows that there is a clear efficiency 
argument to be considered – particularly given the fact that the average damage to a 
property with resistance and resilience measures is typically 50-80 per cent less than it 
would otherwise be (Entec and Greenstreet Berman 2008).  Furthermore, some groups, 
such as the elderly and those with young families, are particularly vulnerable to the 
disruption to the household that can result from months or years spent in temporary 
accommodation as the person‟s home is repaired. However, if a person‟s home is not 
repaired in a resilient fashion, they may have to go through this traumatic experience for 
a second time. This was, indeed, the case for one of our diarists, who was flooded in 
June and then worked hard to get her home repaired for Christmas. However, following 
heavy rain in January, she discovered that water had entered under her floorboards 
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again, and she had to move out of her house (with her husband and young daughter) 
for a second time so that the joists and flooring could be replaced. Going through the 
whole experience again was incredibly traumatic, as she described in her diary: 
 
“I am very emotional at the moment with so much happening in my life, 
personally and professionally, I feel really alone at the moment with no one 
really to talk to about how I am feeling so my emotion has really come out in a 
few different ways, anger, unset, unsettled but then at the same time trying to 
keep positive for other people. I have just come out of a meeting with a 
colleague, which was very hard as I was I discussing every thing to do with 
my work which involves a lot to do with the floods within the city, oh my word, 
I was crying my eyes out which is not really me as I usually listen to other 
people, at this moment in time I am really considering going to see my doctor 
for some support” (Karen, homeowner, diary) 
 
Had Karen‟s home have been repaired in a resilient fashion after the first flood, she 
would not have had to go through this again. After her home flooded for a second time, 
Karen asked her insurance company if she could have a concrete floor installed in her 
home. They refused, and she is now left anxious that she may experience flooding 
again.  
 
We would therefore encourage the government to do everything it can to ensure that 
flooded homes are repaired in a resilient fashion. More research would be needed in 
order to establish the best way of doing this – for example, whether a voluntary code 
would be sufficient, or whether some form of coercion via the Building Regulations 
would be necessary. However, crucial issues to address include the following: 
 Terms of insurance. As stated previously, many homeowners may be encouraged to 
introduce property-level measures if this were reflected in reduced premiums.  
 Who pays for resilient repair? The examples from our diarists that we have 
presented here shows that many people would have considered resilient repair had 
their insurance company been willing to pay for it. We have been told that, for reasons 
of competitiveness, it is unreasonable to expect insurers to fund the installation of such 
measures. However, homeowners are unlikely to pay these extra costs themselves, 
particularly because, despite having insurance, many people find that their finances are 
already tested to the limit during the recovery process. Therefore, if resilient repair is to 
become commonplace after flooding, options for funding, including government or self-
funding, must be clear to all involved (householders, builders, insurance companies) 
 In addition to the general lack of information about what resistance and resilience 
measures are available (as identified previously among both residents and builders), 
homeowners who have just experienced flooding are often in a state of shock. They find 
that the process of making an insurance claim and managing builders is difficult enough 
already and, consequently, they are unlikely to spend any time researching and thinking 
about the options for resilient repair. Participants taking part in our study have said that 
they would like to have been given a guide which explains simply and clearly how to do 
all the things that you have to do after a flood. Perhaps information and guidance on 
resilient reinstatement should be included in this guide. Builders and surveyors should 
also be better informed about the options available, so that they can recommend 
suitable measures to householders.  
 As highlighted previously, poor workmanship has been a major problem for flooded 
residents. Given that it is already difficult to source sufficient numbers of quality 
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builders, tradesmen and materials during the recovery process, some serious thought 
would need to be given to the resilient repair process in order to ensure that work is 
able to be completed swiftly and to a high standard. 
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